PARIS, 20 February 2004 — Whichever way one looks at Iran’s latest general election the result is a decisive defeat for the so-called reformist camp.

The product of an illusion, the so-called reformist movement had deceived itself into believing it could deceive all the people all the time.

It all started with Mohammad Khatami’s election as president in 1997. Iranians turned out en masse to vote for Khatami not because they liked, or even knew, him but because they wanted to prevent the election of the establishment’s candidate whom they knew all too well.

Nevertheless, Khatami’s election manifesto at the time sounded both reasonable and promising. It contained 10 pledges.

The first was to restore law and order to a country where extra-state organs have exercised often arbitrary power since 1979. It is clear that Khatami has failed to honor that pledge.

His supporters, including his brother Mohammad Reza, who was not allowed to stand as a candidate in last week’s election, now speak of a “constitutional coup d’etat” by their rivals.

Khatami’s second pledge was to revive the Iranian economy. Here, too, his record is one of failure. Despite annual economic growth rates of more than four percent in 2002 and 2003, the average annual rate for the past seven years stands at 1.5 percent, which, taking into account a 1.8 percent yearly demographic increase means an actual recession.

Nor has Khatami made any progress on his third pledge: to remove all discriminatory measures against women. If anything Iranian women are likely to receive a big slap in the face when the full results of the latest election are known. It is quite possible that no more than one or two women will enter the new Majlis (parliament).

Khatami’s fourth pledge, to normalize relations with the outside world, also remains unfulfilled. The European Union, always prepared to bend backwards to help Tehran, is beginning to lose patience at what it sees as a pattern of duplicity by the clerics. Washington, having made some conciliatory gestures toward Tehran, now seems hesitant, preferring to wait and see who actually rules Iran. Even the much-heralded restoration of diplomatic ties with Egypt has not materialized.

Khatami had made other pledges: to ease pressure on Iran’s youth, some 65 percent of the population, and to provide jobs for at least some of the 10 million or so men and women shut out of the labor market. Or has he managed to stem the flow of Iranian brains that, according to UNESCO, are leaving the country at a rate of 150,000 a year. A recent United Nations study labels the Iranian brain drain as “the largest ever in history.”

The so-called reform leaders say they are surprised at the fact that the people did not support their 11th hour show of militancy symbolized by a sit-in at the Parliament building last month. During the sit-in the “reformists” made lengthy and passionate speeches. The people yawned.

The reformists then decided to resign but did so only after the parliamentary session had ended. In other words they were quitting the show after the curtain had fallen.

Worse still, the reformists never made it clear what it was exactly that they wanted. They complained about the fact that some of them were prevented from standing as candidates. But they never called for an end to a system under which people can be prevented from standing as candidates. They moaned about “dictatorial and despotic tendencies” in the regime but never proposed any measure to correct them. What they really meant, therefore, was that they would be happy with the system provided they used its machinery against rivals.

The last hope of the reformists was a massive boycott of the polls by the voters. Had that happened they would have been able to claim the result as a round-about victory for themselves. But it didn’t happen. The official figures, backed by reports from some 300 foreign correspondents and information from our own sources, indicated that the turnout had been at least as high as it was four years ago.

The only difference is that this time around some 20 percent of those who went to polling stations cast blank ballots.

What does this mean? It means that many people went to the polls to deny the reformists the low turnout they had dreamed of. At the same time, they cast blank ballots to make it clear that they do not approve of the system.

All in all some 25 percent of the total electorate voted for the candidates. Of those less than a quarter chose the candidates regarded as close to the “reformists”.

A further quarter voted for candidates who have genuine local power bases and could not be classified either as reformist or conservative. Thus the support base for the so-called “conservative” faction amounts to around 12 to 15 percent of the total electorate.

In other words what matters in the present context of Iranian politics is not who gets how many votes - we know that no one can attract a majority - but who controls the levers of power. On that score there is no ambiguity: power in Iran today belongs to the camp identified by Western Iranologists as conservative.

That camp, however, does not consider itself as “conservative” at all.

On the contrary it prides itself as the standard-bearer of the revolution.

Anyone who would think Iran’s true rulers are conservatives would be making a mistake.

Whether anyone likes it or not the Khomeinist movement remains a revolutionary force. As already noted, its support base in Iran has shrunk between 12 to 15 percent of the electorate. But, unlike the confused, not to say hypocritical, reformists, the Khomeinist camp has a clear ideology, a well-established agenda, and well-known methods of dealing with its opponents. It is as it appears. And that, in the context of Iran’s current politics, is a relief for all concerned.

Genuine, or if you like “hard”, Khomeinism, (conservatives) still enjoys some support in Iran. Ersatz, or “soft” Khomeinism as represented by the so-called reformists, however, has no firm constituency.

As long as Iranians are not able to offer a clear alternative to conservatives, the nation will not emerge from its historic impasse. By dispersing the fog of confusion, last week’s election may make the formation of such an alternative that much easier.

Time may prove that the end of the seven-year reformist itch in Iran would be good for the Iranian people and all those who want Iran to resolve its revolutionary crisis and return to normal.